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MEDIATION IN MEDICAL TREATMENT: A MORE
EFFECTIVE WAY TO MANAGE DISPUTES
Caitlin McClay
The right for competent persons to refuse medical treatment is based on their
due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 1
However, this right is not absolute.2 A person’s liberty interest must be balanced
against state interests.3 Further, incompetent patients are unable to consent to
medical treatment.4 In a process called “substituted judgement,” guardians or
legally authorized persons are required to consent to treatment on behalf of the
incompetent person.5 Incompetent patients may either be minors or adults who
legally cannot make decisions for themselves. Those under the age of eighteen
are presumed automatically to lack “maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgement required for making life’s difficult decisions.”6 Adults are
incompetent when they “lack[] capacity to understand and weigh the available
options regarding critical medical decisions.”7 Further, “the level of mental
incapacity needed to be deemed incompetent depends on the nature of the
medical decision at hand.”8 When there is disagreement amongst guardians and
physicians over the incompetent patient’s proper medical treatment, the parties
often turn to the court system for answers.
The adversarial nature of court proceedings is an inefficient and often
ineffective way to resolve disputes. Court proceedings apply legal principles
J.D., The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, 2019; B.A. Christopher
Newport University, 2016. The author would like to thank Professor Lucia Silecchia for her
invaluable guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review for its support in the publication
process.
1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
2. Id. at 279.
3. Id.
4. John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients,
39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 904 (2006).
5. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a
Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance
Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (1996).
6. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 620 (1979) (holding that the Georgia statutory
procedures for admitting juveniles to mental health care facilities did not violate the minor’s due
process rights).
7. Cantor, supra note 5, at 1201.
8. Id. at 1201 n.23. The standard of mental capacity required to make life and death
decisions will be higher than the capacity standard required for patients to make more minor
decisions. It is a sliding scale and the analysis is made according to the facts on a case by case
basis, so there is some variance in results. Id.
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that fail to understand the deep layers of emotion underlying medical decisionmaking.9 Advanced directives are often encouraged by hospitals, but the
documents are often not an accurate reflection of what the patient wants. 10 The
court is no better situated to make medical treatment decisions than the patient
and those closest to them.
In these situations, conflict often centers on a failure of communication
between patient, patient representatives, and doctors and therefore, a lack of
information.11 A better solution to these problems is mediation. Bioethical
mediation that bridges the gap amongst the parties is “(1) less destructive to the
disputants’ relationships; (2) more sensitive to the contextual features of
disputes; (3) more consistent with the principle of patient self-determination;
and (4) less publicly intrusive.”12
Bioethical mediators, employed by the courts, with training in palliative care
are the solution to resolving the dispute. Mediation is not a viable solution in
every case. There are instances where improved communication will not help
parties reach a decision. However, even in these instances, mediation guarantees
the parties have discerned the issue before resorting to a judge. This creates a
more efficient judicial process because the parties have a clear understanding of
the situation prior to court proceedings.
Part I of this Comment will examine four different scenarios in which courts
order medical treatment. The different scenarios include minor children,
competent adults, pregnant women, and incompetent adults. Minor children are
considered incompetent to make medical decisions, so their parents or the state
must consent to treatment on their behalf.13 However, some courts have applied
the mature minor doctrine to allow minors to make their own medical decisions.
9. Alisa L. Geller, In the Aftermath of the Terri Schiavo Case: Resolving End-of-Life
Disputes Through Alternative Dispute Resolution, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 63, 66 (2006).
10. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaption of Miranda to Advanced Directives: A Critique
of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 140, 156
(1999) (explaining that the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires federally funded
hospitals to provide patients with information about advanced directives and laws and policies that
govern advanced directives. In addition to informing patients of their right to create an advanced
directive, the PSDA also requires hospitals to honor the advanced directives). It is important to
note that the PSDA has no requirements about the contents or quality of the advanced directives.
This is a major criticism of the law because it can force hospitals to use poorly thought out or
written documents that have life and death consequences. Id. at 140–41.
11. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007).
12. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U.L. REV. 1091,
1097 (1999).
13. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children:
Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 170
(1983).
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Competent adults do have the right to refuse medical treatment. 14 The right to
refusal will be weighed against state interests on a case by case basis to
determine whether the courts can compel medical treatment.15 Pregnant women
are a subcategory of competent adults in a unique position.16 Courts consider
the competent adult’s right to refuse medical treatment balanced against state’s
interests, which in these cases include the interests of the unborn child. 17 Lastly,
this part of the Comment examines how medical decisions are made in the case
of incompetent adults.
Part II examines the current methods the legal system uses to solve disputes.
First, the use of court orders to compel patients to undergo a particular treatment
or to prevent patients from undergoing a certain medical treatment is examined.
Second, the doctrine of substitute judgement as a method of decision-making is
examined. Next, the Comment discusses the use of advanced directives to keep
medical decisions out of courts and in the hands of the person undergoing
treatment. Finally, Part II examines the current models of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) in place to make medical decisions, specifically reviewing the
use of medical futility statutes in hospital mediation.
Part III proposes a model of ADR that can be used to aid in medical decisionmaking. First, Part III addresses which cases are best suited for mediation and
which cases are not. Then discussed is the necessary features of an ADR model
mediating medical treatment cases and how the ADR model should be
implemented. Lastly, the benefits and drawbacks of using this ADR model to
make medical decisions is explained.
I. TYPES OF CASES IN WHICH COURTS ORDER MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. Minor Children

The Supreme Court stated, “[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are
not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their
need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and must make those
judgments.”18 However, when parents are unable or fail to make such decisions,
14. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–79 (1990).
15. Superintendent of Belchertown St. Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424–25 (Mass.
1977).
16. See Cohan, supra note 4, at 896–97 (discussing the extensive debate on the rights of
women versus the rights of fetuses).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
18. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. Except in emergency cases, doctors must obtain consent from
the minor’s parents in order to perform medical treatment. Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice:
The Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent Refusal of Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical
Treatment Based Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 245 (2006).
This policy behind this law “rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
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courts will intercede in the private interests of the family when the health and
well-being of a minor is involved.19 The Supreme Court said in Stanley v.
Illinois, that the state may only intervene when there is a “powerful
countervailing interest” to protect.20
Especially in the case of minors, it is important to recognize the difference
between “medical treatment . . . important to the child’s well-being” and lifesustaining medical treatment.21 Courts usually will not interfere with decisions
to decline life-sustaining treatment “when there is uncontroverted medical
evidence that a child is terminally ill or is in an irreversible and persistent
vegetative state.”22 In these cases the state’s interest in protecting the child’s
well-being is ensuring that the child suffers as little as possible, which is already
being accomplished by the parents and the physicians.
Courts will, however, intervene when parents refuse “medical treatment . . .
important to the child’s well being . . . particularly if the treatment is necessary
to save the child’s life.”23 When parents withhold consent to certain medical
treatments for their children, they usually do so on religious grounds.24 In these
cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the child’s welfare interest outweighs
the religious liberty interests of the parents and their right to raise children the
way they choose.25 Most often, the state advocates for the conventional medical
approach, while parents advocate for “an alternative treatment that can range
from taking no action to using different forms of unorthodox medical care.” 26
When there is no clear superior medical treatment, it is up to the discretion of
the judge to decide.27
best interests of their children.” Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. Parents make these decisions because
minors need time to develop their own decision-making skills and parents are presumed to have the
best interest of the child in mind when making such decisions on the child’s behalf. Id.
19. Sher, supra note 13, at 157.
20. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 657–58 (1972) (holding that the state cannot
presume that unmarried fathers are unfit).
21. Cohan, supra note 4, at 860–61. “[L]ife sustaining medical treatment” are protocols that
prolong life, but do not save life. Id. at 853. Common examples of life-sustaining medical
treatment includes ventilators and breathing tubes for mechanical respiration and tubes that provide
artificial hydration and nutrition. Id.
22. Id. at 860–61.
23. Id. at 861. “[T]he state will invariably succeed in overriding the right of parents to act as
surrogate decision makers, even if this means violating the parents’ deeply held religious beliefs
that prohibit the treatment in question.” Id.
24. Id.
25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67, 170 (1944) (holding that the state has an
interest in protecting a child from street preaching on a highway, and that equal protection is not
violated in this case because public highways cannot be considered church property).
26. Sher, supra note 13, at 190. This presents a challenge for the courts to decide between
multiple medical experts giving conflicting testimony. Id.
27. Id. at 193.
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B. Mature Minor Doctrine

Ordering medical treatment for minors is further complicated when the child
is older and capable of thinking deeply about his situation and develops his own
treatment preferences. The mature minor doctrine states that “some minors have
sufficient maturity to understand and appreciate the benefits and risks of
proposed medical treatment of all kinds, and thus mature minors should have the
right to give or decline to give informed consent regarding all health care
decisions.”28 The Supreme Court of Tennessee recognizes the mature minor
doctrine and reaches a decision in such cases by considering
[w]hether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment
depends upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, and
degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, as well as upon
the conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident
involved. Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of
the treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor’s
ability to appreciate the risks and consequences are to be considered.29
Additionally, states have passed statutes that allow unemancipated minors to
make medical decisions for themselves, so long as certain criteria is met. 30
In re E.G., the Supreme Court of Illinois heard an appeal of the trial court’s
order that found E.G. was a neglected minor because she and her mother refused
blood transfusions.31 E.G. was seventeen when she was diagnosed with
Leukemia and doctors informed her that a necessary part of life saving treatment
was blood transfusions, and if she refused the blood transfusions she would
likely die.32 At a neglect proceeding in juvenile court, a guardian was appointed

28. Cohan, supra note 4, at 872.
29. Id. at 874; see also In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y.
1990) (recognizing the mature minor doctrine, but finding that the minor in this case did not met
the criteria of a “mature minor”); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989) (holding that a minor
may make her own medical decisions if adjudged sufficiently mature); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724
S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 1987) (recognizing the mature minor doctrine).
30. Will, supra note 18, at 259 n.166–67 (noting that the South Carolina statute allows minors
over the age of sixteen to consent to medical treatment, the Louisiana statute allows minors to
consent to treatment and provides that minors may not refuse treatment a parent has consented to,
the Arkansas statute allows minors of sufficient intelligence to consent to treatment, the Idaho
statute allows anyone competent to make medical decisions to make such decisions even if they are
a minor, the Alaska statute allows minors who receive counseling about the treatment to consent
without parental approval, and the Nevada statute allows minors who understand the treatment and
its purpose to make medical decisions as long as providers work with the minor to keep parents
informed where possible).
31. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
32. Id. “As Jehovah’s Witnesses, both E.G. and her mother desired to observe their religion’s
prohibition against the ‘eating’ of blood.” Id. Her mother did consent to all treatment that did not
require blood transfusions. Id.
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who consented to the blood transfusions on E.G.’s behalf.33 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized “a mature minor may exercise a common
law right to consent to or refuse medical care.”34
C. Competent Adults

Competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment on multiple legal
grounds. The right to refuse medical treatment is recognized as a part of a
person’s due process rights guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.35 The right to refuse medical treatment also implicates the right
to privacy, as medical choices are considered to be deeply personal and
fundamental to the self-determination of individuals.36 The Supreme Court has
also recognized that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” 37 However, the right to refuse
medical treatment is not unlimited; exercise of it must be weighed against state
interest in “the preservation of life.”38
In applying such a balancing test, the court employs the common law doctrine
of necessity, which “holds that certain conduct, though it violates certain rights,
is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence produces a net social gain
or benefit to society.”39 Additionally, the balancing test considers the state
interest in preventing harm to its citizens.40 States and private individuals are
allowed to act when a person poses a danger to themselves or others. For
33. Id. at 323–24.
34. Id. at 328. But cf. In re Thomas B., 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 659–60 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991)
(holding that a fifteen-year-old has no right to refuse medical treatment as the mature minor doctrine
is not recognized, and therefore he should undergo the biopsy procedure because a legal guardian
determined that it was in his best interest); O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. App. 1990)
(holding that Texas has not adopted the mature minor doctrine, and therefore the minor could not
refuse a blood transfusion necessary to save his life after he was struck by a train and required arm
surgery).
35. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding that a state may
require clear and convincing evidence for a guardian to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an
incompetent adult).
36. Cohan, supra note 4, at 857.
37. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
38. Superintendent of Belchertown St. School v. Saikeicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1997)
(recognizing that the state claims a state interest in the preservation of life, and stemming from that
“the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; . . . the prevention of suicide; and . . .
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”).
39. Cohan, supra note 4, at 858 (noting that this principle is rooted in the utilitarian idea of
the “ends-justifying-the-means,” where the totality of public policy considerations justifies the
violation of individual rights).
40. See id. at 859 (discussing how authorities can use force to prevent individuals from
harming themselves or others).
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example, in the incident of a drug overdose,41 medical professionals are
permitted to aid the individual, even if the overdose was casued by a suicide
attempt and the individual is incapable of consenting to treatment. 42
1. State Interest

The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy in Roe v. Wade, stating
that even though, “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.”43 The Supreme Court has also recognized that the state has an
interest in protecting citizens from potential abuse, upholding the integrity of the
judicial proceeding, and above all, the preservation of human life. 44 Some state
courts have also found a state interest in protecting children from abandonment
by forcing their parent to undergo treatment.45
D. Pregnant Women

While competent adult’s right to refuse medical treatment is well recognized,
case law is inconsistent on whether the right is extended to pregnant women. 46
Courts in Illinois and New York have grappled significantly with this issue. 47 In
Illinois, the rights of pregnant women are superior to the rights of the fetus, so
“women have an absolute right to refuse medical treatment.”48 However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the state has an “important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”49 There is case law that

41. Id. at 859–60 (explaining the court is more reluctant to interfere with the patient’s wishes
as the required intervention becomes more invasive).
42. Id. at 859.
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–55 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy is derived
from the substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and that right to privacy
encompasses abortion subject to limitations justified by a compelling state interest); see, e.g.,
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the state interest in obtaining evidence for
a criminal trial did not outweigh the patient’s privacy interest in refusing treatment, and the
defendant shot during a robbery could not be forced to undergo surgery to remove a bullet that the
state wanted to use as evidence against him at trial).
44. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281–82 (1990).
45. Cohan, supra note 4, at 881–82.
46. Id. at 896.
47. Id. at 897.
48. Id. at 898. See also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988) (holding that
there is no cause of action for prenatal negligence by a fetus against its mother); In re Baby Boy
Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a competent woman has the right to
refuse medical treatment even if it poses risks to her viable, unborn child).
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
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holds that the mother’s right to choose her own medical treatment can be
outweighed by the rights of the fetus.50
Further, courts have yet to consider the parental rights of the father when
compelling pregnant women to undergo medical treatment.51 The rights of the
father have not been recognized in the abortion context, but they have been
recognized in the adoption context.52 Cases involving court-ordered medical
treatment can be distinguished from abortion cases because the result of the
former imposes a duty on the father to provide for the child that is not present in
abortion cases.53 Courts must balance the rights of the father with the intrusion
on the mother, but thus far, courts have not addressed this issue.54
E. Incompetent Adults

Competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment as a part of their
right to privacy, right to self-determination, and right to substantive due
process.55 An issue arises when competent adults are no longer competent and
able to exercise these rights. Courts have wrestled with the extent that the rights
of incompetent adults can be effectuated by a guardian.
In re Quinlan was a case before the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding
Karen Quinlan, who was in a “chronic persistent vegetative state[,]” but did not
meet any of the criteria for brain death.56 Karen’s father asked the court to
declare her incompetent and then appoint him as guardian, which would allow
50. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459–60 (Ga. 1981)
(granting temporary custody of the unborn child to the state, so state officials could consent to
medical treatment on the child’s behalf against the mother’s wishes); see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (holding that “the unborn child
is entitled to the law’s protection.”) The Court based its reasoning in part on New Jersey case law
that allowed children to sue their parents for injuries that occurred before birth as a result of
negligence. Id. The reasoning is in part based on the recognition of the courts that the unborn are
entitled to certain rights. Id.
51. David C. Blickenstaff, Defining the Boundaries of Personal Privacy: Is There a Paternal
Interest in Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1157, 1161 (1994).
52. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 893–96 (1992) (holding that spousal
notification imposes an undue burden on a married woman’s ability to get an abortion);
Blickenstaff, supra note 51, at 1181. Courts have held that in some cases the father can even
prevent the mother from giving the child up for adoption. Id. at 1181–82.
53. Id. at 1197–98.
54. Id. at 1158. “The outcome of the balancing test depends on the severity of the
contemplated intrusion and the nature of the asserted interest; if the intrusion is minor and the
benefit great, the state may prevail . . . . The father would assert his interest through the state . . .
.” Id. at 1161.
55. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (discussing how the right to privacy exists under
the Constitution and encompasses the right to decline medical treatment).
56. Id. at 654.
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him to remove life-sustaining treatment.57 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
appointed Joseph Quinlan as guardian of Karen and was specific in their opinion
that
should the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no
reasonable possibility of Karen’s ever emerging from her present
comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that the lifesupport apparatus now being administered to Karen should be
discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital “Ethics Committee”
or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If
that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of
Karen’s ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a
cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be
withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal
liability.58
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Nancy Cruzan was
deemed incompetent after she suffered severe injuries in a car accident.59 Her
parents, as guardians, sought to withdraw her artificial nutrition when it was
determined that Nancy would not recover cognitive function.60 Here, the
Supreme Court held that while guardians may refuse medical treatment on the
part of an incompetent adult, a state is within its right to impose an evidentiary
standard that guardians must satisfy in order to refuse medical treatment on
behalf of the incompetent patient.61
1. Standards Employed by the Courts

Courts attempt to determine the choice that the incompetent patient would
make if he were able using the “substituted judgement” approach.62 Under this
method, the court hears evidence that sheds light on what the patient would
likely desire, and then makes a subjective determination based on the facts
before it.63 Evidence to be heard includes living wills, statements from family
or friends, and anything else that could indicate what the incompetent person’s

57. Id. at 651.
58. Id. at 671–72.
59. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 286–87. The Cruzan’s could withdraw Nancy’s artificial hydration and nutrition if
they could prove by clear and convincing evidence that this is what she would have wanted. Id.
62. Death by Right: A Call for Change to Michigan’s Health Care Decisions Law, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 927, 932 (1995).
63. Id.
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intent would be.64 In most states, the burden of proof is clear and convincing
evidence, however some states require a lower standard.65
An alternative approach used by the courts has been the “best interests
approach,” which uses an objective standard to determine whether or not the
medical treatment serves the best interest of the incompetent person.66 The court
looks at three factors when making its determination: “1) [r]elief from pain and
suffering; 2) the preservation and the potential restoration of the patient’s ability
to function normally; and 3) the quality and extent of the patient’s life if lifesupport is or is not removed.”67 A signficant issue with this approach is that it
assumes there a single objectively correct approach, while in actuality, doctors
frequently disagree on treatment and there may be multiple treatment options
which produce the same effect.68
II. CURRENT METHODS OF RESOLUTION
A. Court Orders

In issuing orders requiring or preventing patients from receving certain
medical treatments, Courts begin by balancing the patient’s rights to autonomy
with state’s interest. The state interests considered are “(1) preservation of life,
(2) prevention of suicide, (3) protection of third party interests, and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”69 How courts
balance these interests varies by state, so the same case may have many different
outcomes based only on geography. 70 This shows the lack of a uniform standard
64. Id.
65. Id. “For example, in the case of Superintendent of Belchertown Schools v. Saikewicz,
the court employed a ‘reasonable person substituted judgement’ standard . . . .” Id. The best
interests approach or a combination of standards have also been used by courts. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Some states combine the substituted judgement and best interests approaches by first
looking for clear and convincing evidence of intent, but if the clear and convincing burden cannot
be met the courts can employ a “‘limited best interests test,’ which permits the court to withdraw
treatment if the sustaining of the patient’s life is outweighed by the patient’s pain and suffering.
Otherwise, if there is no evidence of the patient’s wishes, the court will employ a purely objective,
best interests standard.” Id. at 932–33; see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229, 1232, 1236,
1241–43 (N.J. 1985) (describing this process, focusing on what evidence courts should look to and
weigh when deciding what the patient would have wanted, and concluding there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate the patient would have refused the treatment under the subjective test).
68. See Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills
and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 118 (1993).
69. Cohan, supra note 4, at 851.
70. See David M. Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away From Courts After Thirty
Years of Failure: Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life Disputes, 31
HAMLINE L. REV. 103, 110 (2008) (noting that some scholars believe that the difference in
outcomes reflects courts inserting their own personal and political views into end of life decisionmaking cases).
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for medical disputes, and the need to define more clearly the patient rights and
state interests.71
Allowing courts to resolve these issues is supported by arguments that “courts
can conduct a ‘detached and passionate investigation’ in order to determine
whether to continue or terminate treatment.”72 However, many people correctly
argue that courts are the inappropriate party to decide these cases. The objective
approach offered by courts fails to consider deeply-rooted personal feelings of
the patient and his loved ones that should be accounted for when determining
the best interests of the patient.73 In these highly emotionally charged situations,
judges lack the intimacy with the patient that the disputing parties often have.
These deciscions should be resolved by the people closest to the patient. Further,
escalating the dispute to lititgation adds increased tension to an already sensitive
situation.74 The adversarial nature of our court system will result in damaged
relationships amongst the parties. Trust between the patient’s family and the
patient’s care-giver is vital in creating an optimal atmosphere for these delicate
circumstances.75
The burden placed on patient’s familiesfamily’s to prove the patient’s wishes
is also a frequently criticized consequence of resolving these disputes with
litigation.76 Courts hold that “the burden [is] on the patient, guardian, or family
to prove that termination or continuation of life-sustaining treatment truly
reflects the patient’s interests. However, physicians, health care institutions, or
hospital ethics committees may make decisions to continue or terminate lifesustaining treatment without much potential for repercussion.” 77 However, this
burden is likely not difficult to meet in most situations, as patients and their
guardians are most likely to be aware of the patient’s wishes.78 This burden
serves as a safeguard to situations in which the patient’s family or guardians
advocate for a deciscion contrary to the true desires of the patient. In that case,
the courts would play a vital role in protecting the rights of a patient who could
not advocate on their own. Further, it makes sense that hospitals and doctors do
not carry this burden, because while the patient has a right to refuse treatment,
the hospital and doctors are not obligated to provide a certain kind of treatment. 79
Courts are not the ideal decision makers in these disputes. But, they
undoubtedly must be a part of these disputes. It is the job of the court systems
to protect the rights of individuals. Sometime that protection is in the form of
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
Gatter, supra note 12, at 1095.
Shelton, supra note 70, at 112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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upholding patient wishes when the doctors feel differently, but in other situations
the courts might need to protect the patient from their own family acting contrary
to the patient’s best interests.
B. Surrogate Decision Makers

Most states have statutes that allow a surrogate to make medical decisions
when someone is incapacitated without an advanced directive. 80 The statutes
often establish a priority list of family members authorized make medical
decisions for the incapacitated person, starting with spouses, immediate family,
and then extended family.81 If family members are not available, some statutes
allow another adult “who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient,
who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, [and] who is reasonably
available” to serve as a surrogate.82 Finally, if no such unrelated adult is
available, the doctors are permitted to make health care decisions based off what
a majority of people would elect.83
1. Benefits of Surrogate Decision Makers

The benefits of designating a surrogate to make health care decisions are that
it is an efficient decision-making process, it yields a clear answer so parties know
exactly who has authority, and it keeps family matters out of the courts.84 Most
Americans seem to agree that immediate family members are the group of
people that should make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated person.85 While
surrogate decision-making with priority lists may be effective, the ultimate
question should be whether the decisions made by surrogates are consistent with
what the incompetent patient would have wanted.
Priority lists are criticized for accommodating the unique structure or
dynamics that some families have.86 This is a fair criticism, but it does not
80. Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care Decisionmakers For
Patients Without Advanced Directives: A Psychological Critiques, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 984 (2008).
81. Id. at 984–85. Some states allow for domestic partners or close friends to be surrogates,
some states involve the incapacitated patient’s doctors in the selection process of the decision
maker, and some states allow the interested parties to select the surrogate amongst themselves. Id.
at 985. The Uniform Healthcare Decision Act also establishes a priority list that is similar to most
states and provides that if a surrogate is not available, a health care provider may obtain consent
from “any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in
descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: (1) the spouse, unless legally separated; (2) an
adult child; (3) a parent; or (4) an adult brother or sister.” UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §
5(b) (1993).
82. Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 81, at 985 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-1111806(c)(2) (West 2006)).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 987–88.
85. Id. at 989–90.
86. See id. at 990–91.
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diminish the need for decision-making statutes. It is not possible to create a
statute that encompasses all unique family strucutres and dynamics. The
decision-making statutes are intended to serve as default rules. They are a
starting point, and any competent adult is free to designate a different choice
than what the statute may require. Additionally, considering how few adults
contemplate such decisions ahead of time, there is a great need for default rule.87
Decision-making statutes could be improved by accounting for other factors
that often influence decision-making. For example, age may play a significant
role in one’s decision on who should be a surrogate, but age is not considered in
the statutes.88 Culture is also not accounted for in the decision-making statutes,
but different cultures within the United States have values and norms regarding
care of one of their members that is not contemplated in statutes. 89
2. Criticism of Surrogate Decision-Making

The major drawback to surrogate decision-making is when the surrogate
makes a choice inconsistent witht the desires of the incapacitated. This may
occur in two likely scenarios. First, studies show that surrogates have a hard
time making decisions for incompetent adults when their wishes are unknown.90
Surrogates “often do not know the wishes of the person on whose behalf they
are making decisions, even if they think that they do.”91 The second scenario, is
when surrogates outright refuse to effectuate the wishes of the incompetent
patient.92 One study found that one-third of surrogate decision makers would
consent on behalf of the principal to a medical study when they knew that is not
what the principal would have wanted.93
Surrogate decision makers and the statutes that authorize them provide an
efficient and clear solution when doctors require consent for an incompetent
adult.94 As default rules, they represent what the American public in general
would want.95 To better accommodate individual cases, the patient should
designate a surrogate himself. The major drawback to surrogate decision makers
87. Id. at 986–87.
88. Id. at 990–91 (noting also that gender is a factor that is not considered by decision-making
statutes, but females are disproportionately chosen as surrogates over their male counterparts). A
person might prefer their brother make medical decisions over their elderly parent. While another
person might prefer their elderly parent decide over their eighteen-year-old child. Statutes are not
able to accommodate these more particular, yet important, considerations. Id.
89. Id. at 992–93 (explaining that some cultures, like Korean-Americans, have a more
“‘family-centered’ model of decision making” that is less individualistic and more communal).
90. Id. at 996.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 987–88.
95. Id.
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is that they do not always act according to the wishes of the incompetent
patient.96 Further, there are no safeguards that can require the surrogate to act
according to the principal’s intent, if the surrogate even knows what the
principal’s intent is at all.97 Surrogate decision-making is an important first step
in medical decision-making, but it is not enough to keep disputes out of court.98
C. Advanced Directives

Advanced directives serve as an instrument for patients to record their wishes
for end-of-life deciscions in the event that they ever become incapacitated. 99
Implementation of advanced directives guarantees that the patient preserves his
right to self-determination, even when incapacitated.100 However, the major
failure of advanced directives is how rarely they are created.101
Advanced directives, when properly utilized, allow a patient to maintain their
autonomy in health care decisions. A competent patient is capable of
contemplating what medical treatment that is in his best interest.102 Advanced
directives allow a competent adult to ensure any end-of-life deciscions made
when he is incapacitated will respect his wishes, such as his religious beliefs. 103
Furhter, advanced directives shield medical providers from liability when actting
according to the patient’s advanced directive. 104
There are drawbacks to advanced directives. Many adults never create an
advanced directive, which limits their benefit and utility as a solution for
improving end-of-life decision-making as a whole.105 It is also difficult for
96. Id. at 981.
97. See id. at 996–97. Research shows that surrogate decision makers frequently do not know
what the incapacitated person would want, even if they believe that they do. Id. This makes
medical decision-making very difficult for surrogates, even if they are trying their best to effectuate
the incapacitated person’s wishes. One study found that a spouse’s ability to predict the other
spouse’s preference on CPR treatment varied from forty to ninety percent. Id.
98. In some cases, there are multiple surrogate decision makers, and they can disagree over
treatment which may lead to a court dispute. Additionally, disagreements with medical staff or
over a specific treatment can bring a dispute to court. Id. at 1010.
99. Shelton, supra note 70, at 127.
100. Id. at 128.
101. Id. at 129.
102. Id. at 128.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 129.
105. Id. It has been found that
less than 25 percent of individuals enact advanced directives or living wills. Perhaps this
shockingly low rate of enactment is a testament to individuals feeling that their families
and physicians will make the right decisions for them when that time arrives. Supporters
of advanced directives and living wills cannot explain this phenomenon by arguing a lack
of awareness by the public, especially in the wake of the increased publicity surrounding
the formation of living wills following the Terri Schiavo dispute.
Id. at 129–30.
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advanced directives to provide sufficiently detailed instructions that can be
implemented by medical professionals even in the most unpredictable of
situations.106 Additionally, the frequent improvement of medical technology
requires that advanced directives, to be easily administered, are routinely
updated to account for the current state of technology. 107
Advanced directives are a strong solution for competent adults who take the
time to fully contemplate what their choices would be, should they become
incapacitated. Advanced directives remain effective as long as there is a periodic
review of the document to account for improvements in medical technology and
the person’s current wishes.108 However, despite being a well-know resource,
many people never create an advanced directive.109 Most people do not take the
time to write down such decisions and discuss them with their caregivers or
family members.110 And, often times, it is deficiencies and vagueness within the
advanced directive that leads to a challenge in court.111 Therefore, advanced
directives are not a pratical solution to keeping medical disputes out of court.
D. Futility Statutes

Most states have enacted futility statutes, which allow doctors to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment in certain situations. 112 Futility statutes are
intended to resolve situations in which the patient or his surrogate seek to
continue treatment, while doctors recovery of the patient is impossible. 113 It is
often the decision of a surrogate to withdraw life support, and when faced with
such a devastating decision, some surrogates refuse to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment.114 Futility statutes permit doctors to unilaterally decide to withdraw
care and shield them from liability.115
The proponent’s arguments for the advancement of futility statutes is that they
further “the goals and values of medicine.”116 Futility statutes are argued to
protect a level of professional integrity so that doctors are not forced to provide
106. Id. at 130–31.
107. Id. at 130–32.
108. See id. at 131–32.
109. Id. at 129.
110. See id. at 129–30.
111. See id. at 130.
112. Pope, supra note 11, at 3–4.
113. Id. at 9–10.
114. Id. at 10–12. Some surrogates feel guilty for withdrawing treatment, and are unable to
deal with that grief. Id. Some surrogates believe that new medical technology will became
available that will change the futility of their loved one’s current situation. Id. In some cases,
surrogates are even distrustful of the medical professionals giving advice. Id.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id. at 16.
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treatment that will fail to patients.117 Doctors want to foster an environment
where resources are used prudently, patients’ integrity is respected, and families
have an accurate expectation for the future.118 This is why “standards of
professional practice . . . [do not] include measures aimed solely at maintaining
corporeal existence and biologic functioning. Under these circumstances
providers feel that continued LSMT is . . . being used for the wrong ends.
Moreover, health care providers find it gruesome, distressing, and demoralizing
to provide treatment that harms patients.”119 Doctors’ recommendations are the
product of strong and deliberate thought. Doctors often accommodate the
surrogate’s wishes initially “as a matter of sensitivity to religious, cultural, or
moral values.”120 However, if there is continued disagreement over treatment
methods and goals, resolution of the futility dispute will depend on hospital
intervention or their legal channels.
1.

E. Alternative Dispute Resolution Currently in Place

Futility Dispute Resolution

Hospitals have a process in place that works to settle disputes between doctors
and patients or their deciscion makers. The first step in resolving these disputes
is communication between the patient, the patient’s caregivers or surrogates, and
the medical staff.121 The second step is to bring in a mediator to help the parties
come to a consensus as to a care plan.122 The next step is to go to the hospital
ethics committee if a resolution cannot be reached with a mediator.123 If the
provider and surrogate are still unable to make a decision on patient care, then
the provider may attempt to change the decision maker.124 The provider can see
if there is another person authorized legally to make a decision and evaluate if
that person would be willing to withdraw life-sustaining measures at the
objection of the first decision maker.125 Alternatively, some medical providers
have attempted to argue that the decision maker is abusing the patient by
requiring him to submit to unnecessary medical treatment, and upon a finding of
neglect, a new surrogate would be required to be appointed. 126 If the provider is
117. See id. at 15–16.
118. Id. at 17–18.
119. Id. at 15–16.
120. Id. at 20.
121. Id. at 22.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23. “[T]he provider will typically ask the institutional ethics committee to intervene.
The committee usually, though not always, agrees with the treating physician’s recommendation to
stop LSMT.” Id.
124. Id. at 23–24.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 24.
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unable to change the decision maker, “then the health care provider should do
one of the following: (1) find a new provider or (2) attempt to transfer the patient
to another institution willing to comply with the surrogate’s treatment requests.
While this is rarely successful, it does sometimes resolve a few additional
disputes.”127 The final step is for the hospital to unilaterally withdraw care.128
This process handling futility disputes within hospitals has considerable room
for improvement. Doctors and scholars tend to disagree over what information,
how much information, and when to provide the information to the decision
makers.129 Patients facing a dispute over medical treatment are at a disadvantage
because they lack the medical knowledge of the doctors, they are in a strange
and unfamiliar setting, and they are facing significant amounts of physical and
emotional stress.130
2.

Hospital Ethics Committees

In addition to a dispute resolution process, “[c]ourts and health care
institutions have granted hospital ethics committees varying degrees of power,
all of which allow the hospital ethics committee to maintain great control over
patient decisions.”131 Hospital ethics committees have become increasingly
popular since the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed their use in In re
Quinlan.132 The powers enjoyed by ethics committees include veto power over
patient treatment, power over the appointment of a guardian, and power over
whether or not to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.133 Hospital ethics
committees are composed of hospital employees, mostly nurses and doctors, and
occasionally one member of the community. 134 Training and expertise of
individuals varies by individual and by committee.135 Some ethics committees
have moved to a mediation model rather than a decision-making model. 136
127. Id. at 25.
128. Id. For instance,
[o]ne recent five-year study of sixteen hospitals found that in approximately sixty-five
cases, the hospitals decided to unilaterally stop LSMT. Another study of nine hospitals
found that they decided to unilaterally stop LSMT in 2 percent of 2,842
cases. Furthermore, there are strong reasons to suspect that the rate of intractability and
unilateral hospital action will rise.
Id. at 26.
129. See id. at 22 n.90.
130. Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life: Getting Beyond
the Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 143, 162 n.89 (2007).
131. Shelton, supra note 70, at 113–14.
132. Id. at 113.
133. Id. at 114.
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id. (noting that some members of these committees lack sufficient training to make these
decisions, whether it be medical or ethical).
136. Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 148–49.
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However, ethics committees still have not been able to effectively reach
resolutions, and usually the hospital ethics committees acquiesce to the decision
makers wishes.137
The major criticism of hospital ethics committees is that they put their own
professional and institutional interests above those of their patients.138 The
committees are made up of medical professionals who naturally have an interest
in protecting the institution that employs them. Even before disputes reach the
courts, the process of the ethics committee is adversarial between the hospital
and the patient, which causes problems for physicians still treating the patient in
question.139
Ethics committees make decisions on a spectrum. Their deciscions range
from taking unilateral action by the hospital to caving to patient’s demands. The
extent to which a hospital exercises power will depend on its own interest. 140
3.

Bioethical Mediation

Some hospitals employ mediators to assist in disputes when patients, their
families, and doctors cannot reach a treatment decision.141 In such cases a
mediator steps in between doctors and patient decision makers to increase
communication, and hopefully come to a consensus on a care plan for the
patient.142 Opinions on mediation in medical disputes is mixed. Those that
advocate for mediation believe that it is a “forum for fully understanding the
interests of the parties involved, as well as a forum for dealing with bioethical
concerns.”143 Some argue that mediation impedes on a patient’s right to
autonomy because it creates a procedural barrier that patients or their decision
makers must work through before treatment can be administered or
withdrawn.144 The strongest argument against mediation in medical disputes is

137. Id. at 149. Hospitals often find it easier and more efficient for their own operation to give
in to the surrogate decision maker, rather than pursue the course of action in conflict with the
surrogate decision maker. For the hospital, it avoids potential lawsuits and saves time for the
doctors and head administrators who no longer need to discuss the dispute. Id. at 149, 158–59, 159
n.81.
138. Shelton, supra note 70, at 113–15.
139. Gatter, supra note 12, at 1099. Adversarial disputes between patients, doctors, and
decision makers threaten the trust enjoyed between doctors and patients and can cause problems
for the doctor and the patient if the doctor must still provide treatment and information to the patient
and surrogate decision makers involved in the dispute as it is being litigated. Id.
140. See Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 148–50; Shelton, supra note 70, at 113–15.
141. Id. at 143–45.
142. Pope, supra note 11, at 22–23
143. Shelton, supra note 70, at 132.
144. Id. at 134.
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that the typical goals of mediation do not fit the typical medical dispute
situation.145
The typical goal of mediation is to reach some sort of compromise between
the two parties where each party walks away with something bargained for.146
That is not possible in most of these cases.147 No compromise can be reached
when only one of two scenarios can prevail: ending or continuing life-sustaining
treatment.148 Typical mediation in these cases have failed because it does not
accommodate the unique nature of medical disputes.
First, the needs of the decision maker and the family of the patient need to be
acknowledged and addressed in the decision-making process. Family members
are often the surrogates in these cases and they may, at times, have different
religious or moral views than the patient.149 Family members also have to deal
with the aftermath of the treatment decision in ways that the patient does not
have to consider. If the choice results in the death of the patient, then grief may
be may be a factor considered by the patient’s family or deciscion maker, but
not the patient.150 The family is also responsible for providing for the patient.
The patient’s family unfortunately must consider finances when looking at
treatment options, even when the patient might not consider such interests or
even be able to.151 The family and decision makers surrounding the patient need
to be considered in the mediation process.
Another problem with mediating medical disputes is that the mediator is often
employed by the hospital. A common problem in medical disputes that doctors
seek to avoid is that the patient and their family will distrust the doctors on their
case.152 Part of this distrust stems from the dispute being the doctor against the
patient. A mediator employed by the hospital will not remedy the situation, it
will make it worse. Now it is the doctor and another employee against the
patient. For mediation to work, the conflict of interest must be removed.

145. See Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 149. In many medical disputes, specifically
those concerning end of life-sustaining treatment, there are only two choices: administer the
treatment or not. In most mediation settings, the two parties can come together and form a mutually
agreed to solution founded in compromise. In medical disputes, that kind of compromise is
oversimplified. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End-of-Life Decision-Making, 9
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 253, 271 (2004).
146. Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 149.
147. Id. at 143.
148. See Cohen, supra note 146, at 271–72.
149. Shelton, supra note 70, at 121.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Gatter, supra note 12, at 1103.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF MEDIATION

Mediation can be effective in resolving medical disputes because it allows the
two parties to gain an understanding of the interests of each person involved.
Mediation also gives an opportunity to the patient’s decision makers to gain a
better understanding of the medical issues and a realistic idea of how they can
be solved.153 Critics of mediation characterize the dispute as a simple “yes or
no” question, but the decision being made is influenced by the interests of each
individual involved and though the treatment might be simple, the consequences
are far reaching and far more complicated.154 Mediation provides a forum to
discuss the medical decision and address the moral and ethical concerns that
underlie such decisions.155
Mediation must be “a fair process and seek to protect parties choosing to use
ADR.”156 The mediator must be a neutral third-party with the requisite training
to handle medical disputes.157 Finally, litigation must be an option because some
parties will not reach a solution.
One area of law where there has been increased use of mediation is in divorce
proceedings.158 Therefore, there is more research about the effectiveness of
mediation in the divorce context. The successes and failure of mediation in the
divorce context can be used in formulating a mediation process in the medical
treatment context. Mediation in the divorce process allows parties to air
concerns, provides a neutral third-party, and is less adversarial than traditional
litigation.159
The ability to air concerns in mediation aligns well with the medical treatment
construct. The mediator can give the parties an opportunity to voice their
concerns. Doing this through caucusing allows parties to vent their feelings and
be exposed to opposite view points in an environment where they feel
comfortable.160 The mediator can facilitate this discussion and help parties
understand the information they are lacking.
153. See Shelton, supra note 70, at 135–36.
154. Id. at 137.
155. Id. at 136.
156. Id. at 139.
157. Id. The mediator should not be employed by the hospital. See id. at 141. When the doctor
is viewed as an adversary, introducing another hospital employee who wields greater power over
the situation will not diffuse the conflict. Rather a neutral third-party who does not know the doctor
or the hospital should come in. Id.
158. Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation
Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 989, 990–91 (2000) (noting an increase of
alternative dispute resolution programs throughout the country, specifically in the family law
context).
159. Id. at 996.
160. Shelton, supra note 70, at 134–35. Mediation allows the parties to discuss outcomes and
ask questions without committing to a particular treatment. Id.
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A neutral third-party is another characteristic of divorce mediation that
translates well to medical treatment mediation. Mediation must protect the
parties involved to be effective. The patient, first and foremost, needs to be
protected from being coerced into making medical decisions against their
interests.161 It is important for the mediator to “equalize power imbalances
between the parties.”162 This can be done by ensuring the patient and the family
understands the medical terminology used by the physicians.163
The mediator must be a neutral third-party to avoid conflicts of interest. 164
When there is a medical dispute and the patient or their family distrust their
doctor, having a mediator employed by the hospital is not helpful. The mediator
is simply an extension of the doctor and the hospital at that point, and this further
adds to the trust issues of the patient. The goal is for a neutral third-party to
bring the two sides together so each party can better understand the other’s
interests.165 Mediators should not be employed by the hospitals because it is
unlikely the mediator would remain neutral and not consider the interests of his
employer. Even if the mediator could remain neutral, the appearance to the
patient and their family would not be one of neutrality.
Some argue that a mediator employed by the hospital, though not neutral, is
still beneficial because the mediator might better understand the hierarchy of the
hospital and the different challenges the hospital presents.166 However this
argument underestimates the strain a patient or their deciscion maker’s distrust
of the hospital, including its employees, might detrimentally effect the mediation
process.167 If the patient and family are not trustful of the mediator, then the
entire process will likely be ineffective, because “in reality too many conflicts
may arise from the mediator’s affiliation with one of the potentially interested
parties.”168 Therefore, the most practical alternative is to have the mediation run
through the courts. The mediators do not necessarily need to be employed by
the courts, but the courts need to be responsible for oversight.
161. All parties share an interest in the patient being as informed as possible, and if the patient
lacks capacity, that the decision makers be as informed as possible. The patient is influenced by
the doctors and by their own family, and in some cases, either could unduly influence the patient
to make a choice they do not want. Doctors, medical staff, patients, family members, and surrogate
decision makers all need to be working to best understand the situation and potential outcomes.
Doctors and surrogate decision makers need to check the patient’s capacity. Has the patient
regained capacity to make decisions by himself? How much is the incapacitated patient capable of
understanding, and are they being given as much information as possible?
162. Id. at 139.
163. Id. at 139–40.
164. Id. at 141. Mediators in dispute resolution models currently in place may be employed
by the hospital as part of the hospital’s mechanism to handle these disputes. Id.
165. Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 149.
166. Shelton, supra note 70, at 141.
167. See id. at 141 n.302.
168. Id. at 141.
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It should be noted that everyone has biases that are brought into mediation
and litigation.169 Ideally these feelings will not impact decision-making, but no
problem-solving mechanisms will be perfect. Mediation offers an opportunity
for the mediator to disclose biases at the beginning so parties are aware at the
outset how the mediator’s judgement might be affected.170
One concern that arises when considering power imbalances, even with
neutral third-party decision makers, is the frequency players are involved in the
process. The patient and the surrogate decision maker are likely to be involved
only once, while the hospital is likely to be involved multiple times. It is
important to note that such power imbalances happen whether the parties appear
before a judge or a mediator. Mediation offers more flexibility in its process, so
mediators are able to employ a variety of techniques aimed at correcting power
imbalances.171
A neutral mediator is an important feature and vital to the success of
mediation. However, the neutral position of the mediator must be paired with
additional training to properly manage disputes. Mediators in these cases also
need additional training. The first question to address is what profession these
mediators will come from. Then, the additional training to be a mediator, and
further to be a mediator in the medical treatment context, must be considered.
Beyond standard mediation training, mediators of medical disputes need
bioethical training.172
It is of the upmost importance that the mediators understand the medicine
within these disputes, so they can properly manage the mediation process.173
There is some debate about whether mediators must be attorneys. 174 Some argue
that mediators must be limited to attorneys because it is a natural extension of
the legal profession, legal skills are required for mediation, and lawyers as
mediators will give the mediation process a sense of legitimacy. 175 The
argument against limiting mediators to attorneys is, in part, that it restricts the
169. Beck & Sales, supra note 159, at 1001, 1004
170. See id. at 1004–05.
171. See id. at 1004.
172. Shelton, supra note 70, at 140. Mediators need to understand the cultural, religious, and
moral issues at play and how they interact with medical issues.
173. Id. It would be the role of the mediator in these instances to help the doctor and the
decision maker better understand each other. Frequently, this will take the shape of the mediator
helping the decision maker to understand the doctor and the medicine the doctor is trying to explain.
One key role of the mediator in these cases is to make sure that patients and their families
understand the medical terminology. Id. at 139–40.
174. Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification Programs, 4
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (1999) (explaining that major players in the mediation
movement have strongly emphasized that mediators do not need a law degree, but at the same time
most court-approved lists of mediators are only composed of attorneys giving them a considerable
advantage).
175. Id. at 202.
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pool of mediators, which limits access to mediators. 176 Additionally, no studies
indicate that having a lawyer as a mediator will lead to a better outcome. 177
In the context of medical disputes, having mediators from other backgrounds
can be a benefit. The likely pool of mediators would be lawyers, doctors, nurses,
and social workers. All of these professions require advanced education, making
it more likely the entire mediation process is viewed with confidence and
legitimacy. While legal skills may be required for mediation, medical
knowledge would also be required for this type of mediation. No matter the
original profession of the mediator, it is likely that they would need additional
training. Doctors can certainly learn how to mediate, and lawyers can learn the
medicine behind a certain dispute.178 Though mediation is a natural extension
of the legal profession, medical decision-making is not. Medical understanding
and mediation skills are both critical qualities of an effective mediator in this
context. Possession of a law degree or a medical degree will not indicate an
automatic aptitude for mediation. The pool of potential mediators should remain
open to non-lawyers and those with the requisite training should be able to serve
as mediators.
Training is essential to a successful mediation program.179 The amount of
training for mediators is another large source of debate.180 Some believe that
training should amount to graduate level coursework in a variety of applicable
fields, while others believe training should be short to allow volunteers to serve
as mediators.181
In the medical dispute context, it is unrealistic to ask an attorney or doctor to
obtain an additional graduate degree for a position that is may not be his fulltime work. This is balanced with the complex nature of medical disputes that
implicate legal, bioethical, religious, and financial concerns.182 A certificate
program with smaller courses covering these areas would produce well-trained
mediators. Additionally, mediators should call on their own experiences in their
service as mediators.183
As mentioned previously, courts provide a neutral forum to resolve disputes
and as such should oversee mediation. Extending from this, the legal system
should oversee quality control of mediators. Bar associations oversee quality of
176. Id.
177. Id. at 204.
178. Acting as a mediator is not for everyone. Some attorneys, especially those familiar with
legal disputes arising in the medical context, may be well suited to serve as mediators. Additionally,
some doctors with the requisite training in mediation and the applicable legal background may be
well suited to mediate.
179. Id. at 216.
180. Id. at 215–17.
181. Id. at 218.
182. See supra Part II.
183. Henning, supra note 175, at 216–17
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attorneys, a smaller but similar mechanism within already existing bar
associations could set standards and manage mediators.
Finally, for mediation to be successfully implemented, litigation must remain
an option. Some disputes will not be resolved through mediation. It is important
that each party understands what rights they have, so they can use them if they
feel it is necessary.
IV. CASES WHERE ADR WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE

In some cases, mediation will not help settle the medical dispute, and the only
solution will be to turn to the courts. One such case is a medical dispute where
religious beliefs prevent a particular treatment option.184 There is no
misunderstanding that can be resolved. Another case arises when surrogate
decision makers refuse to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, even with all
available information. For example, one study found that in approximately 2
percent of end-of-life disputes, the hospital acted unilaterally by ending lifesustaining treatment.185
V. CASES BEST SUITED FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The cases best suited for mediation are those in which the disagreement is
over the type of treatment to provide. In these cases, the parties can often benefit
from clarifying information.186 The mediator can ensure that the parties
understand the science behind the medical dispute, and then use an increased
understanding to work toward a solution.187 These cases arise when parents
disagree with doctors over treatment of their minor child, or when the two
parents disagree over treatment. These cases can also arise when the caregivers
disagree with their elderly loved one or their doctor over treatment. An
important part of mediation is that the parties come together and develop a care
plan that both are comfortable with.188
184. Pope, supra note 11, at 76. For example, if a Jehovah’s Witness requires a blood
transfusion, there is no amount of mediation or discussion that will change the minds of either party.
The ability to compromise treatment is also limited. There may be some room to tailor the
treatment, but ultimately if a blood transfusion is needed, there is currently no medical alternative.
185. Id. at 26 (finding that 2 percent of the 2,842 end-of-life dispute cases in a study conducted
on nine hospitals resulted in unilateral action by the hospital to end treatment).
186. Sometimes, in addition to the provided information, parties need time to digest the
information and accept the outcome. Id. at 20–23.
187. Shelton, supra note 70, at 135.
188. Pope & Waldman, supra note 131, at 157–58. Current models of mediation of end-oflife disputes have within their process discussion of shared goals, so parties can have a better idea
of realistic outcomes, goals, and priorities. Participation by surrogate decision makers in the
formulation of the care plan is also an important part of mediation, as all parties’ needs are
considered and planned for. The involvement of the family in formulating a care plan is also
important for their ability to understand what is going on, as well as helping the family to accept
what is going to happen, which is often an undesired outcome. See Pope, supra note 11, at 22–23.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Mediation will not be effective in all cases, but that does not mean that a failed
mediation attempt has no value. The process of mediation will bring parties to
better understand the others’ interests, so even if there is litigation there is better
understanding.189 The knowledge of the other party’s interests makes litigation
easier on an emotional level for the parties.190 That kind of understanding cannot
be achieved through litigation alone because those interests no longer matter.191
Mediation provides a forum for interested parties to be heard. Litigation is
not concerned with the individual interests of doctors, hospitals, or surrogate
decision makers. In litigation, the concern is only for the patient and the facts
before the court.192 But, these cases have devastating impacts for all parties
involved.193 Mediation can make such a painful process easier.
Mediation will work in other cases and save the parties time and money by
keeping the dispute out of court.194 Mediation can play a valuable role in
medical decision-making because it helps parties to better understand the issues
and each other.195 The neutral third-party mediator can shift the power balance
so it is equal.196 Patients and their families often need help understanding the
medical issues and what their treatment options are.197 Doctors need to better
189. Shelton, supra note 70, at 134. Mediation can also act to balance the rights of those from
disadvantaged backgrounds that are more likely to be challenged asserting their rights in a legal
dispute. The process of mediation can assist them in asserting their rights to choose or refuse care
as the process is more personal with the mediator holding the hands of those involved. It adds an
additional party to ensure everyone understands what is going on. See id.
190. Id. (stating that mediators can help parties recognize their feelings). As the conflict
continues, parties tend to become more polarized in their positions and more adversarial, which
leads to an escalation in conflict. Gatter, supra note 12, at 1109. Mediation offers the parties the
opportunity to better understand the other party’s position, and thus deescalate the situation. Id.
191. Shelton, supra note 70, at 138.
192. Id. at 137–38. In the courtroom, the judge is only able to consider the patient. A major
drawback to this approach is that often times adverse consequences facing the care givers and
surrogate decision makers will ultimately affect the patient. The patient in some cases can still feel
the hardships on those closest to him or her, and those are often the decision makers involved in
the dispute.
193. Larry H. Strasburger, The Litigant-Patient: Mental Health Consequences of Civil
Litigation, 27:2 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L., 203, 203–04 (1999) (noting that all lawsuits have
an element of loss, some more than others, but for both plaintiff and defendant the process is
stressful and can even exacerbate the injuries the court is trying to solve).
194. Id. at 210 (noting that some clients turn to mediation in civil lawsuits to avoid the financial
costs of trial, and additionally mediation is a solution to the massive amount of time individuals
must devote to resolving disputes in court due to the lengthiness of trials and judicial proceedings
as well as time they must dedicate away from their normal lives).
195. Shelton, supra note 70, at 134–39.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., id. at 121 (referencing the case of Terri Schiavo to describe how families may
have misunderstandings about treatment).
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understand the motives behind a patient’s decision. Doctors also have personal
interests that need to be protected, such as avoiding liability. 198 The mediator
can help both parties reach a solution that acknowledges both parties’ interests.

198. See Pope, supra note 11, at 43. Doctors and hospitals have a large concern of civil and
maybe even criminal sanctions if these conflicts are not resolved properly. They are exposed to
lawsuits for failure to get informed consent, medical malpractice, negligence, wrongful death,
criminal regulatory sanctions, statutory damages, and murder. Id. at 44–47. In Barber v. Superior
Court, for example, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office prosecuted doctors for murder
because they removed life-sustaining treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state at the
request of the family; the charges were rejected because the removal was done with the consent of
the designated surrogate. Id. at 48. The seriousness and gravity of consequences for resolving
disputes improperly creates a chilling effect on doctors, so they, along with hospital administrators
and staff, are less likely to challenge surrogate decision makers and are often unduly cautious in
their decision-making. Id. at 49–50.

